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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kirsten Spier-Turner appeals the denial of her motion to suppress evidence found when
police searched her purse for drug evidence at the arrest scene long after they had transported
Ms. Spier-Turner to jail. The district court adopted the State’s argument and reasoning that the
search was constitutionally justified as a search incident to arrest, which was the only exception
to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement that was argued by the State below. In its
Respondent’s Brief, the State raises a different theory, the “inventory search exception,” and asks
this Court to affirm the district court’s decision on that newly-raised theory. (Resp. Br., pp.711).
This Reply Brief is necessary to demonstrate that the State’s newly-raised “inventory
search” theory is not properly before this Court because the State did not argue that exception
below and the district court did not address or decide Ms. Spier-Turner’s motion based on an
application of that exception. The State’s new theory should be rejected.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Ms. Spier-Turner’s Appellant’s Brief.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Spier-Turner’s motion to suppress?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Spier-Turner’s Motion To Suppress; The State’s
New Theory, Advanced For The First Time On Appeal, Is Not Properly Before This Court
The police officers violated Ms. Spier-Turner’s Fourth Amendment rights when they
searched her purse and the district court should have granted her motion to suppress. As argued
in Appellant’s Brief, the district court erred when it concluded that the warrantless search of
Ms. Spier-Turner’s purse was justified as a search incident to arrest, which was the only
exception to the warrant requirement argued by the State below. (R., pp.57-59; Tr., p.48, L.7 –
p.50, L.25.) The State has offered no argument in response.
Instead, the State has presented a new theory, raised for the first time on appeal, that the
search of the purse for drug evidence should be upheld as an “inventory search.” The State’s
newly-raised theory is not properly before this Court and should be rejected. Should this Court
decide to consider that theory, the State’s arguments still fail on the merits because an “inventory
search” was not conducted in this case. For these reasons, and those argued in Appellant’s Brief,
the district court’s order denying Ms. Spier-Turner’s motion to suppress should be reversed.
A.

The District Court Did Not Consider Or Decide Whether The Inventory Search Exception
Applied In This Case; Having Failed To Argue That Exception Below, The State Is
Precluded From Arguing That Exception For The First Time On Appeal
The State’s argument that the search of Ms. Spier-Turner’s purse is justified under the

“inventory search” exception is not properly before this Court because the State did not argue the
inventory search exception below (see R., pp.54-59; Tr., p.48, L.7 – p.50, L.25), and, contrary to
the State’s assertion on appeal (Resp. Br., p.3, n.1), the district court did not decide that the
search of Ms. Spier-Turner’s purse was authorized as an inventory search (Tr., p.61, L.19 – p.63,
L.2).
As stated in the opinions of the Idaho Supreme Court,
3

This Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Issues not
raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, and the parties will be
held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court. … We
have long held that “[a]ppellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories
and arguments that were presented below.”
State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275 (2017) (internal citations omitted); accord,
State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017) (“[T]he law does not permit parties to swap horses
between courts in order to get a better mount in the Supreme Court.”); State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho
585, 416 P.3d 957 (2018) (the State’s failure to make the argument in the district court “spells
the fatal resolution of this argument on appeal”). The Idaho Supreme Court recognizes an
exception to this rule, however, where the issue was actually decided by the district court.
State v. DuVault, 131 Idaho 550, 554 (1990).
1.

The State Did Not Argue The “Inventory Search Exception” In The District Court

The sole exception to the warrant requirement argued by the State below was that the
search was a lawful search incident to arrest. (R., pp.57-59; Tr., p.48, L.7 – p.50, L.25.) The
State’s argument in support of that theory included the language and rationales of United
States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), and State v. Slaybaugh, 108 Idaho 551 (1985).
(R., pp.57-59.) Specifically, the State quoted Edwards’ rationale that “[s]earches and seizures
that could be made on the spot at the time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the
accused arrives at the jail” (R., p.57), and Slaybaugh’s holding that “delayed container searches
incident to a valid arrest may be lawful.” (R., p.57.) However, the State made no claim in the
district court that the search of the purse was an inventory search, nor did the State otherwise
argue the inventory search exception applied in this case. (See generally, R., pp.57-59; Tr., p.48,
L.7 – p.50, L.25.)
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2.

The District Court Did Not Decide That The Inventory Search Exception Applied
In This Case

Contrary to the State’s assertions on appeal (Resp. Br., p.3, n. 1), the district court did not
address or decide Ms. Spier-Turner’s motion under the inventory search exception. Rather, after
it declined to find that the purse was covered by the search warrant for the residence, the district
court “turn[ed] to the issue of search incident to arrest….” (Tr., p.62, Ls.8-10.) The district
court then adopted the very arguments and authority presented by the State to deny Ms. SpierTurner’s motion. (Tr., p.62, L.20 – p.63, L.2.) The district court did not find that the search of
the purse was authorized under the inventory search exception, because the district did not find
that the search was conducted as part of a routine administrative procedure incident to
incarceration. (See generally Tr., p.61, L.8 – p.63, L.6.)
Because the State did not argue the inventory exception below, and because the district
court did not consider or decide that theory when it denied Ms. Spier-Turner’s motion to
suppress, the State’s appellate argument that the search should be justified as an inventory search
is not properly before this Court and should be rejected.
B.

The Warrantless Search Cannot Be Justified Under The Inventory Search Exception
Because No Inventory Search Was Conducted
Even if this Court were to consider the State’s newly-raised argument, this Court should

conclude that the inventory search exception does not apply because the search that was
conducted was not an inventory search. The officers expressly testified that they searched the
purse for contraband (Tr., p.36, Ls.8-18), and there is no indication the police had attempted to
take an inventory of the contents of the purse, other than of the evidence that they had seized.
(See generally Tr.) For these reasons, the inventory search exception is inapplicable in this case.
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Moreover, the investigatory search of Ms. Spier-Turner’s purse served none of
justifications and conformed to none of the requirements that would legitimize the search as an
inventory search. The Court of Appeals has described the law regarding the inventory search
exception as follows:
Inventory searches are a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment. The legitimate purposes of inventory searches are: (1)
protect the owner’s property while it remains in police custody; (2) protect the
State against false claims of lost or stolen property; and (3) protect police from
potential danger. However, an inventory search must not be a ruse for general
rummaging in order to locate incriminating evidence. “Inventory searches, when
conducted in compliance with standard and established police procedures and not
as a pretext for criminal investigation, do not offend Fourth Amendment strictures
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
State v. Stewart, 152 Idaho 868, 870 (Ct. App. 2012).
Because no formal or informal inventory of the purse’s contents was ever taken, the
search cannot be justified as a measure taken to protect Ms. Spier-Turner’s property. Likewise,
because there was no inventory of the purse’s contents while it was in police hands and before
placing in the car, the search cannot be justified as a measure taken to protect the police from
potential claims of theft. And because the officers had no basis for suspecting the contents of the
purse posed any type of danger to them, and because they had decided to place the purse in a car
rather than retaining custody of it, the search cannot be justified as a measure to protect law
enforcement personnel from danger. For these additional reasons, the search cannot be justified
under the inventory search exception.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons above and those set forth in her Appellant’s Brief, Ms. Spier-Turner
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s denial of her suppression motion,
vacate her judgment of conviction, and remand the case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 26th day of September, 2018.

/s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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